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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion. Hopefully, that retreat is only a temporary regrouping. and James
may yet be considered as an aberration rather than the initiation of a
trend.
JIM D. COOLEY
Constitutional Law-Fighting Words or Free Speech?
During its history of roughly thirty years, the "fighting words"
doctrine' has been an often cited but seldom controlling limitation in the
area of first amendment freedom of speech. In the recent case of Cohen
v. California,2 the Supreme Court acknowledged the continuing vitality
of the "fighting words" doctrine but rejected the contention of the State
of California that it was controlling in that particular case. Paul Robert
Cohen was convicted of violating a California statute which prohibits
"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neigh-
borhood or person . . . by . . .offensive conduct."' 3 His arrest resulted
from his wearing a jacket inscribed with "Fuck the Draft" plainly
visible while walking through the Los Angeles County Courthouse.
Cohen claimed that the jacket stated his feelings about the war in Viet-
nam and the draft and that his expression was constitutionally protected.
In affirming Cohen's conviction the California Court of Appeals inter-
preted "offensive conduct" to mean "behavior which has a tendency to
provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn disturb the peace." 4 The
'Under the "fighting words" doctrine inflammatory words that are used in a manner calcu-
lated to provoke a breach of the peace are excluded from the first amendment protection generally
afforded speech. The term itself comes from the following passage: "'The English language has a
number of words and expressions which by general consent are "fighting words" when said without
a disarming smile. . . .Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings.'" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942), quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 320, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (1941).
2403 U.S. 15 (1971).
3CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970).
'People v. Cohen, I Cal. App. 3d 94, 100, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis by the
court). In explaining its interpretation, the court said: "As modified by case law the only 'offensive'
conduct prohibited by section 415 is that which incites violence or has a tendency to incite others
to violence or a breach of the peace. . . .This standard . . . eliminates prosecutions or convictions
for conduct which is merely offensive." Id. at 102, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (emphasis added). Recent
Supreme Court holdings clearly establish that the exercise of constitutional rights may not be
impinged upon merely because the exercise in some way offends the sensibilities ofsome individuals.
In Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (the flag-burning case), the Court said, "It is
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court found Cohen's behavior so potentially annoying that "it was cer-
tainly foreseeable that such conduct might cause others to rise up to
commit a violent act against the person of the defendant or to attempt
to forceably remove his jacket."5 The California Supreme Court. by a
divided vote, refused to review the case. 6
In attempting to analyze Cohen's conduct in terms of "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements, the California Court of Appeals cited United
States v. O'Brien7 a case in which the defendant had been convicted of
burning his selective service card in protest against the Vietnam war but
in violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.8 The
Supreme Court in O'Brien upheld the conviction, saying that "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms." '9 The nonspeech element of Cohen's conduct consisted
of marching through a public building with the intent of attracting
attention to the message on his jacket. Unlike the nonspeech element of
O'Brien's conduct, however, the nonspeech element of Cohen's conduct
was unquestionably legal. The California court failed to make this dis-
tinction, concluding that the expression was likely to produce violence
from viewers and was therefore subject to regulation: "[N]o one has the
firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." In a case involving the
distribution of highly critical leaflets in the home neighborhood of an Austin realtor, the Court said
that "so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of acceptabil-
ity." Organization For a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). On the subject of
freedom of assembly, the Court said: "The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State
to make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because its exercise may be 'annoying'
to some people." Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971). The Court considered, and
rejected, the assertion in Cohen that California could censor the four-letter word Cohen used on
the ground that it was "offensive" to the sensibilities of those who might inadvertantly be exposed
to it. 403 U.S. at 22-26.
51 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
GSubsequent to Cohen's conviction and prior to the Supreme Court decision in Cohen, the
California Supreme Court in In re Bushman, I Cal. 3d 767, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375,463 P.2d 727 (1970),
construed § 415, under which Cohen was convicted, for. the first time. Four dissenting United
States Supreme Court justices in Cohen thought it proper to remand the Cohen case to the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the Bushman decision. The majority saw no
substantial difference between the construction of § 415 by the California Supreme Court in
Bushman and that of the Court of Appeals in Cohen.
7391 U.S. 367 (1968).
950 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1970).
1391 U.S. at 376.
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right to express his views by means of printing lewd and vulgar language
which is likely to cause others to breach the peace to protect women and
children from such exposure."' 0
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of the argument that Cohen's
conviction rested on permissible regulation of the nonspeech element of
his conduct. The conviction, the Court found, rested clearly on the offen-
siveness of the words Cohen used to convey his message. The qustion left
to be resolved, then, was whether the expression could be prohibited
because its use was inherently likely to cause a violent reaction from
viewers. This was the primary basis on which the California court had
affirmed the conviction.
In view of the particular facts involved in Cohen, and the Court's
reaffirmation of "fighting words" as a viable doctrine of constitutional
law, it is instructive to examine Cohen in the context of the history of
that doctrine. Unlike the epithets hurled in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire," the case in which the "fighting words" concept was given
initial explicit recognition by the Supreme Court, Cohen's message
lacked any element of personal abuse or immediate likelihood of retalia-
tion. In discounting the inherently provocative nature of the message on
Cohen's jacket, the Court pointed out that the message was not "'di-
rected to the person of the hearer' 12 and that no individual reasonably
would have regarded the words as a direct personal insult. In Chaplinsky
a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of breaching the peace after calling'
a city marshal a "damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist" when
the marshall tried to warn him that the crowd to whom he had been
speaking was becoming restless. The statute involved forbade addressing
"any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is
lawfully in any street 6dr other public place" or "call[ing] him by any
offense or derisive name."' 3 The statute had been interpreted by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court as limited to the use in a public place of
101 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
11315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
12403 U.S. at 20, quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940). In Cantwell a
Jehovah's Witness was convicted of breach of the peace after playing a phonograph record attack-
ing the Catholic Church while soliciting contributions from two Catholics. The Court overturned
his conviction, noting that although he offended the listeners and aroused their anger, there was
"no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no
personal abuse." '' U.S. at 310.
13315 U.S. at 569.
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words directly tending to cause a breach of the peace by provoking the
person addressed to engage in acts of violence.14 Mr. Justice Murphy,
writing for a unanimous Court, said in Chaplinsky:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene.
the profane, the libelous, and the iisulting or 'fighting' words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 5
Seven years after the Chaplinsky decision, the Court in Terminiello
v. Chicago"6 clarified its position as to the kind of speech which would
be excluded from the operation of the doctrine despite the provocative
nature of the message. The case dealt with Terminiello's breach-of-the-
peace conviction following an inflammatory speech he delivered at a
meeting sponsored by the right-wing Christian Veterans of America.
Terminiello differed from Chaplinsky in that Terminiello's speech was
delivered in an auditorium and not on a public street.' 7 A large, hostile
group had gathered in protest outside the auditorium in which Termi-
niello was speaking, and the police were unable to prevent several dis-
turbances from occurring. The trial court had instructed the jury that
any behavior which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance"' s violated the
ordinance. Seizing upon the trial court's interpretation of the ordinance,
the Court reversed Terminiello's conviction on the ground that such an
expansive interpretation of the ordinance would render it unconstitu-
tionally broad. Although the argument before the Court had centered
on the issue of whether Terminiello's speech contained "fighting words"
which carried it outside the scope of first amendment protection, the
Court never reached that issue. 9 Nonetheless, the majority opinion em-
"State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754 (1941).
"5315 U.S. at 571-72.
1"337 U.S. 1 (1949).
"Id. at 2.
'11d. at 3.
'old.
19721
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
phasized that it is often the unsettling effect of speech which gives it
much of its value. The Court said:
Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are. or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That
is why freedom of speech, though not absolute . . . is nevertheless
protected against censorship or punishment. unless shown likely to
produce a clear and present danger20 of serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience. annoyance. or unrest. 2'
The majority's opinion in Terminiello evoked a strong dissent from
Mr. Justice Jackson, who felt that in freedom of speech matters the
Court had gone too far in the individual's favor at the expense of the
public interest in order. He contended that excessive efforts in that direc-
tion were self-defeating: "In the long run, maintenance of free speech
will be more endangered if the population can have no protection from
the abuses which lead to violence." 22
Two years after the Terminiello decision was handed down, the
Court took a rather drastic turn in the direction Mr. Justice Jackson had
favored in that case. Feiner v. New York23 involved a statute which, in
effect, forbade incitement of a breach of the peace. Irving Feiner was
arrested after making allegedly inflamatory statements to a group of
Negroes and whites gathered on a street corner. Among other things, he
urged the Negroes to rise up and fight for equal rights. The crowd
became restless and there was some milling around. After asking Feiner
three times to discontinue his speech, the police arrested him. In contrast
20The "clear and present danger" test was originally enunciated by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): "The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." One commen-
tator says, "In limited areas the test may still be alive, but it has been conspicuous by its absence
from opinions in the last decade." Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"-A Note on
Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289, 297 (1968). See Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910-912 (1963), for a history of the
clear and present danger test.
1337 U.S. at 4.
"Id. at 36-37.
-340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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to the Termniniello situation, no disturbances in fact resulted from Fei-
ner's speaking. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld Feiner's convic-
tion after accepting the state court's findings that the arresting officers
were motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order
and not simply by a desire to suppress Feiner's views and opinions.
The decision in Feiner took the Court quite a distance from the
position stated in Terminiello, in which the Court had spoken approv-
ingly of a function of free speech as being to invite dispute, create
dissatisfaction, and stir people to anger.24 Of course, the Court was
referring to the peaceful dissemination of ideas, but implicit in the
Court's language in Terminiello is the idea that a speaker should enjoy
the protective efforts of the state while he is expressing his ideas, even
though they may be unpopular. In Feiner the Court balanced the individ-
ual's interest in freedom of expression against the societal interest in
order. The case was rightly or wrongly decided depending upon how one
evaluates the facts.2 The majority opinion equated Feiner's expression
to an incitement to riot. The minority found it to be simply an exercise
in soapbox oratory accompanied by the mutterings and unrest which
commonly attend the public exposition of unpopular ideas.Narrowly construed to cover only incitement to riot when the dan-
ger is real and imminent, Feiner seems to strike a reasonable balance
between individual and societal interests. However, if the rationale for
suppression to preserve order is applied when the danger is not so real
and the disorder not so imminent, "cities and states can with impunity
subject all speeches, political and otherwise, on streets or elsewhere, to
the supervision and censorship of the local police. ' 2 Although the Court
did not expressly refer to "fighting words" in Feiner, clearly the Court
balanced the societal interest in order against Feiner's interest in free
expression just as it had balanced similar interests in Chaplinsky. Since
Feiner the Court has consistently protected the public expression of ideas
despite the fact that disturbances might thereby be engendered.
In Cox v. Louisiana,27 the Court overturned the conviction of Rev-
erend Elton Cox for disturbing the peace in connection with a civil rights
march he led in Louisiana. He had urged the marchers to demand service
2337 U.S. at 4.
"There was a difference of opinion among the Justices as to what "facts" were revealed by
the record. 340 U.S. at 321-29 (Black, J., dissenting).
2 1d. at 323.
-379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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at segregated lunch counters. This exhortation was deemed inflamma-
tory by the local sheriff, who attempted thereafter to break up the dem-
onstration. The trial judge stated that bringing 1.500 Negroes into the
business district of Baton Rouge and urging them "'to descend upon
our lunch counters and sit there until they are served' ",28 was an inherent
breach of the peace. The Supreme Court, however, found that the evid-
ence showed only that the opinions and ideas peacefully expressed were
sufficiently opposed to those of the majority of the community to attract
a crowd and necessitate police protection. Quoting an earlier decision,
the Court said. "'[C]onstitutional rights may not be denied simply
because of hostility to their assertion or exercise.' "2' The decision in
Cox is difficult to reconcile with Feiner despite the Court's assertion that
"this situation . . . is 'a far cry from the situation in Feiner . . . .' "I"
In a racially charged situation, Feiner had made unpopular remarks
about the need for Negroes to take action to obtain equal rights, and
his conviction for breaching the peace was affirmed. Cox's remarks were
made in a much more explosive situation, but the Court overturned his
conviction and expressly recognized his right to police protection while
expressing his views in a hostile community .3
A recent case touching on the "fighting words" doctrine is Street
v. New York. 32 Street was convicted of violating the New York
flag-desecration statute after he had burned an American flag to pro-
test the shooting of James Meredith. Street had said at the time, "If they
did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag" and "We don't
need no damn flag."' 33 The Supreme Court rejected the state's contention
that these statements constituted "fighting words." The Court said:
Nor could such a conviction be justified on the. . . ground mentioned
above: the possible tendency of appellant's words to provoke violent
retaliation. Though it is conceivable that some listeners might have
been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant's disrespectful words.
we cannot say that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflamma-
tory as to come within that small class of "fighting words" which are
2Id. at 550.
21379 U.S. at 551, quoting Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963).
0379 U.S. at 551, quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963).
31Accord, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
-394 U.S. 576 (1969).
1Id. at 579.
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likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace."
In Chaplinsky the Court suggested three possible reasons for hold-
ing Chaplinsky's words to be outside the protection of the first amend-
ment: (1) they "inflict injury," (2) they "tend to create a breach of the
peace," and (3) they "are no essential part of the exposition of ideas.135
In judging Cohen by these standards, it is apparent that only the second
could possibly apply. The Court correctly noted that Cohen's message
was not directed at anyone; it clearly was not personal abuse hurled at
a particular individual. Thus it is impossible to maintain that anyone
could be "injured" by Cohen's message in the manner in which one is
injured when subjected to personal abuse of such nature as to be akin
to a physical assault. Furthermore, the words Cohen used were clearly
an "essential part of the exposition of ideas"; there was no exposition
of ideas apart from the display of words on Cohen's jacket. While it is
clear that Cohen could have utilized a less offensive phrase to convey his
message, it is also clear that the words succinctly expressed the idea
Cohen sought to convey. The Court noted that "much linguistic expres-
sion serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inex-
pressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force."36
To allow the suppression of speech because it may tend to create a
breach of the peace is to open the door to censorship of unpopular views
by those ready and willing to create a disturbance to silence speakers
with whom they disagree.37 The Court came perilously close to this in
Feiner but since that holding has consistently held that constitutional
rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their exercise.38
In Cohen there was no evidence that anyone had even threatened a
"Id. at 592, quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
1315 U.S. at 571-72. See Lowey, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate In Flag Desecra-
lion, 49 N.C.L. REV. 48, 82 (1970), for a discussion of whether flag desecration can constitute
"fighting words" for any of these three reasons.
3403 U.S. at 26.
37This fear is expressed by Mr. Justice Black in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951)
(dissenting opinion).
38See, e.g.. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). For a discussion of the need for tolerance
of unpopular views, see Pollitt, Free Speech For Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REV. 39
(1967).
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disturbance. In reversing the conviction, the Court reiterated that "'an
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance . . . is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' "-39
What then distinguishes "fighting words" from ordinary words?
Fighting words "inflict injury" and "tend to create a breach of the
peace." Clearly, the Court in Chaplinsky had reference to terms so
strongly abusive as to be analogous to a physical assault. In Cohen no
epithets were employed, and the message was not directed at any particu-
lar individual. Thus the message lacked the highly personal nature which
characterized the insult in Chaplinsky. The highly personal nature of the
insult, the degree of abusiveness in the insult, and the immediacy of the
probable retaliation distinguish fighting words from other words. It is
impossible to list the words which might constitute fighting words when
hurled as an insult; they vary with the times and with the local customs
of people. In the 1940's "Fascist" was a highly abusive term, and in the
1950's and 1960's "Communist" was often used in name-calling. The
determinative factor is the manner in which the words are used. When
highly abusive words a're used in a manner so provocative as to virtually
assure retaliation, the "fighting words" doctrine operates to exclude
such expression from first amendment protection. As Cox, Street, and
Cohen indicate, the societal interest in order must clearly outweigh the
individual interest in expression to justify application of the narrow
doctrine of "fighting words."
JOSEPH E. WALL
Constitutional Law-Torts -Defamation and the First Amendment: The
Elements and Application of the Reckless-Disregard Test
On June 7, 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed down
its latest decision concerning the conflicting interests of state libel law
and the first amendment. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia1 was a libel action
brought by a distributor of a nudist magazine against a radio station
for broadcasting defamatory news bulletins concerning his arrest for
11403 U.S. at 23, quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969).
1403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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